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Abstract
In 2012, after decades of trans and travesti activism in Argentina, the law on gender identity was finally adopted. Travesti
activists Diana Sacayán and Lohana Berkins were at the forefront of these efforts. The same year, after the long struggle of
the feminist movement, ‘femicide,’ understood as the murder of women by men in the context of gender-based violence,
was incorporated into the Criminal Code as aggravated murder. This legal amendment also criminalized hate crime based
on the sexual orientation or gender identity of the victim. Mobilized by Sacayán’s murder in 2015, the trans and travesti
collective sought to make the experiences of exclusion and marginalization of the travesti collective visible by coining the
notion of ‘travesticide,’ and demanded it to be used in the ensuing criminal trial that followed her death. Constrained by
the legal notions of femicide, gender-based violence, and hate crimes, the Tribunal introduced ‘travesticide’ in their deci-
sion, yet questions on how to properly operationalize this notion in criminal law remain. Each notion offers opportunities
and poses difficulties in making the murder of travestis politically visible and accounted for. By a detailed analysis of the
final judgment, this article reflects on the implications of the notions used in the trial and the possible lessons for future
interactions with the criminal justice system.
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1. Introduction
Trans persons and travestis in the Americas have articu-
lated numerous social collectives to fight against the per-
sistent subordination and injustices they face. Likewise,
in Argentina, travestis successfully organized and advo-
cated for their rights. In doing so, assuming the ‘travesti
identity’ was a first step to making their demands visible,
triggering a powerful dynamic of self-naming, recogni-
tion and mobilization. Yet what does ‘travesti’ entail and
how is it different from ‘transgender’?
As Santana (2019, p. 212) points out, “travesti does
not correspond to the English travesty [transvestite],
which is related somewhat to a performance in drag.”
Identifying as travesti entails “the refusal to be woman,
the refusal to be intelligible,” but also “the refusal to be
trans” (Machuca Rose, 2019, p. 243), since the travesti
identity goes beyond gender. Unlike the English ‘trans-
gender,’ ‘travesti’ articulates aspects of race, class, abil-
ity, and other forms of difference (Rizki, 2019, p. 148).
Thus, as Santana (2019, p. 213) explains, being travesti
“is not a total negation of themselves as women but a
negation of an imposed dominant expectation of wom-
anhood.” The travesti identity seeks to elude the iden-
tity categories constructed by a state system of social
oppression (Berkins, 2003, p. 136). In fact, travesti pol-
itics evoke the historical marginalization of the collec-
tive, one with clear racial, able-bodiedness, and elitist
undertones. Diana Sacayán’s self-identification as ‘trava
sudaca originaria’ helps underscore the different dimen-
sions of her travesti identity. By focusing on Diana’s
murder trial, this article pays particular attention to the
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travesti identity, yet, in line with Rizki (2019), it also rec-
ognizes that trans and travesti identifications are con-
stantly shifting and thus, it does not immediately as-
sume they are mutually exclusive (Rizki, 2019, p. 149),
but separate.
The visibilization of travesti realities has triggered a
considerable number of reforms across different legal
and policy realms. Among them, criminal law constitutes
a crucial battlefield for such change given the histori-
cal criminalization of trans/travestis under repressive po-
lice codes (Berkins, 2007; Fernández Valle, 2018). In fact,
the first travesti association, the Association of Argentine
Travestis (in Spanish, ATA), was formed in 1991 to fight
police brutality and abuse, gradually leading to the abo-
lition of the most repressive norms. Nevertheless, the
trans/travesti collective continues to be disproportion-
ately affected by new forms of persecution, such as the
criminalization of the promotion of sex work (Fernández
Valle, 2018, p. 50; Sosa & Ferrero, 2018) or drug traffick-
ing (Malacalza, 2018).
However, (trans) feminisms in Latin America, and also
in Argentina, have often been ambivalent regarding the
use of the punitive system to address issues that reveal
structural inequality and disadvantage, since it cannot
solve these issues and in fact, because it is rooted in a
patriarchal structure, it often sustains the criminalization
of the most affected sectors of society (Zaffaroni, 2000).
At the same time, there has been a tendency towards in-
creased criminalization, particularly in relation to severe
forms of violence against women and feminine subjectiv-
ities (Acosta Vargas, 1999; Costa, 2014).
Aware of these tensions regarding punitivism, mak-
ing trans/travestis’ experiences visible in the criminal
fora and translating them into demands could challenge
their persistent profiling as suspects of crime and recon-
figure them as subjects of protection, transforming both
criminal and criminological discourse. The trial for the
murder of trans activist Diana Sacayán offered a perfect
scenario to do this. This article explores how the main
(historical) demands of the trans and travesti community
in Argentina, explored in Section 2, were reconfigured
and introduced in the criminal proceedings. Section 3 dis-
cusses the final judgment in detail by examining the po-
sition of each of the parties to the trial in relation to the
key aspects described in Section 2, and how these were
interpreted by the judges in relation to the elements of
the crimes. Section 4 reflects on the findings and high-
lights the positive aspects for similar strategic litigations,
and draws attention to some problematic areas.
2. Historical Claims of the Trans/Travesti Community
and Institutional Responses
There have been three main historical claims of the
travesti and trans community in Argentina: the legal
recognition of their preferred gender; the possibility
to decide on their bodies; and the accountability for
their murder.
2.1. Legal Gender Identity
The campaign for the legal recognition of the self-
perceived gender identity in Argentina articulated de-
mands about social positioning, participation, and the
fight against the violations of rights. Until recent times,
Argentinian media regularly portrayed travestis as a dan-
gerous threat to ‘moral society.’ Assuming the travesti
identity became an act of resistance, followed by mo-
bilization and alliance making as a main political strat-
egy (Berkins, 2003). This led to the creation of sev-
eral associations, such as the already mentioned ATA,
the Association for the Fight for Travesti Transsexual
Identity (led by Lohana Berkins) and the Organization
of Travestis and Transsexuals of Argentina. In this pro-
cess, the term ‘travesti’ achieved a new and empowering
meaning, cleared from the negative connotation given by
the police (Berkins, 2007).
Gender identity demands sought to consolidate this
process and ensure the enjoyment of human rights. The
lack of legal recognition of gender identity signified the
starting point of a continuum of violence and system-
atic violations of basic rights, such as the expulsion from
the home, the education, the health system, and the
labour market, leading travestis to sex work and expos-
ing them to health risks, criminalization, social stigma,
and police abuse (Radi & Pecheny, 2018). The legal recog-
nition of gender identity, thus, makes the enjoyment
of other rights possible, giving citizenship and demo-
cratic participation a newmeaning (Berkins & Fernandez,
2005; Cabral Grinspan & Viturro, 2006; Pecheny & De la
Dehesa, 2011; Radi & Pecheny, 2018; Rapisardi, 2003).
The demands for the legal recognition of gender iden-
tity began to take shape in the first decades of 2000,
with the formation of the Anti-Discrimination Liberation
Movement (MAL, led by Diana Sacayán), the Argentinian
LGBT Federation (FALGBT), and the National Front for the
Gender Identity Law. The National Front for the Gender
Identity Law and FALGBT prepared a draft law on Gender
Identity,whichwas finally adopted in 2012 as Law26.743.
The law entitles a person to change their sex and name in
an administrative proceeding, without requiring medical
or psychological advice or body intervention, and recog-
nizes the person’s right to undergo therapy, treatments
or surgeries, provided by the State. The implications of
the law on bodies are discussed in Section 2.2.
The law was celebrated by trans activists and al-
lies, but it was also critiqued by travesti activists be-
cause it upholds the binary construction of the sexes as
men/women, “cancelling out the travesti or trans iden-
tity” (Wayar, 2012). Nevertheless, as deMauro Rucovsky
and Russell (2019, p. 224) point out, the law has be-
come “a political toolbox rather than a mere legal instru-
ment,” which has impacted the interpretation of other
laws, including criminal law as we shall see, and it has
also helped to disrupt the binary construction of gen-
der identities by, for instance, allowing registries and
courts to grant identity documents without gender indi-
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cation. These challenges to binary sex were also present
in the most recent annual feminist meeting―‘Encuentro
Nacional deMujeres’ (gathering thousands of women ev-
ery year)―calling for a new name that explicitly includes
trans/travesti subjectivities and realities. They have also
been institutionally supported by the creation of the na-
tional ministry for ‘Women, Genders and Diversities.’
To some extent, Law 26.743 also contributed to the
realization of basic substantial rights, such as the right
to education, health, housing, and work. This has been
particularly the case for younger generations (Saldivia
Menajovsky, 2018), yet the adult trans/travesti commu-
nity has not experienced substantial changes and have
limited access to basic human rights due to insufficient
implementation (Korol, 2018; Viturro, 2014).
2.2. Body Sovereignty
According to Fernández (2003), the visibilization gained
during the 1990s provided an opportunity to question
the sex/gender binary and the social construction of bod-
ies and sexes. ‘Travesti bodies’ are seen as cultural, so-
cial, and political objects (Fernández, 2003, p. 147) that
confront the oppressivewestern construct ‘man/woman’
(Berkins, 2007). Laws have controlled and disciplined
their bodies in different ways. Social rejection and insti-
tutional harassment, particularly by the police, are ways
of disciplining travesti bodies that do not comply with
dominant appearances, either because the lack of re-
sources prevents them from accessing the technologies
to change their bodies or because they are comfortable
with their own embodiment.
Restricting the possibility to change one’s gender at-
tributed at birth is anotherway of policing bodies. Before
the adoption of Law 26.743, the ‘real’ gender of an adult
person was determined by judges with the advice of dif-
ferent medical disciplines, regardless of the person’s will.
The law stripped judges and doctors from such power
and gave it back to the individual. Since then, the per-
son is free to determine their gender identity in a simple
administrative procedure free of charge.
Moreover, the approach of Law 26.743 towards body
intervention is one of rights rather than requirements.
Article 11 substantiates the right to a “free personal de-
velopment” (Ministerio de Justicia y Derechos Humanos,
2012a) ensuring that every person older than 18 can
access surgery or hormonal treatments to adapt their
bodies to their perceived gender identity, without any
judicial or administrative authorization. This approach
discourages binary and hegemonic depictions of bodies
and, importantly, it entails the legal recognition of the
person’s ‘sovereignty’ on their own bodies, a longstand-
ing demand of the trans/travesti community. The insti-
tutional cultures, however, show difficulties in accom-
modating the new law since the medical and judicial
practices of requiring physical and psychological exami-
nations are deeply rooted, and so are hegemonic and bi-
nary views of bodies.
2.3. Murder Accountability
Trans/travesti and feminist activists in Argentina have
also demanded accountability for gender-basedmurders
for decades. Different conceptualizations have emerged
in that process, each carrying different symbolic and le-
gal implications. This section discusses the conceptual-
izations (femicide, travesticide, and hate crime) that are
relevant to fully understand the final judgment on Diana
Sacayán’s murder, their theoretical and symbolic mean-
ing, and their legal implications.
2.3.1. Femicide and Travesticide
The visibilization of femicide relates to a historical and so-
cial process of recognition of the human rights of women
and their right to a life free from violence. The theoret-
ical concept of ‘femicide’ made the systematic murder
of women visible. It was defined by Radford and Russell
(1994) as the killing of women perpetrated by men and
elaborated further by Lagarde (2006) to underline the
gendered nature of the killings and the social constructs
behind them. The notion was introduced in shadow re-
ports, amicus curiae briefs, and individual petitions be-
fore the Inter-American Human Rights System (IAHRS).
In 2008, the Committee of Experts monitoring the Inter-
American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment,
and Eradication of Violence against Women adopted
the Declaration on Femicide (Mechanism to Follow Up
Convention of Belém do Pará Committee of Experts on
Violence, 2008), and the Inter-American Court onHuman
Rights (IACtHR) recognized it in González et al. v. Mexico
(‘Cotton Field’). In Argentina, Casa del Encuentro, a fem-
inist association, published the first report on femicides
the same year.
These demands resulted in the adoption of Law
26.485 in 2009 on the integral protection of women
from violence and the amendment of the Criminal Code
by Law 26.791 in 2012 on gender-based crimes. The
amendment to the Criminal Code consisted of introduc-
ing new aggravations to murder in Article 80, capturing
the gender-based nature of the crimes. It explicitly crim-
inalized the murder of “a woman, committed by a man
in a situation of gender-based violence” (Ministerio de
Justicia y Derechos Humanos, 2012b, Article 80.11), com-
monly referred to as ‘femicide’ in all prosecutorial guide-
lines, protocols, doctrine, and the media. The introduc-
tion of these aggravations follows the regional tendency,
encouraged by the IAHRS, to adopt gender specific def-
initions of crimes as an attempt to making visible the
structural power imbalances that underlie such crimes.
Gendered definitions of crimes send a strong message
that such violence is unacceptable, challenging gender
stereotypes that view violence as natural and belonging
to the private sphere. Yet, the question arises whether,
beyond such symbolic meaning, gender specific crimes
help in preventing impunity and improve access to jus-
tice. In principle, they contribute to collect disaggregated
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criminal statistics, revealing the prevalence of such vio-
lence and adopting more effective policy measures.
Adopting a gendered definition of femicide, how-
ever, did not per se yield significant changes in prac-
tice. In fact, in 2015, the impunity of violence against
women and girls in Argentina reached unprecedented
levels, triggering social uproar. This year would become
a milestone for several reasons. On June 3rd, 2015,
a massive nation-wide demonstration against the mur-
der of women took place, setting in motion an orga-
nizedmovement that expanded to other countries in the
Americas―the #NiUnaMenos movement―actively sup-
ported by Diana Sacayán and Lohana Berkins.
These demonstrations resulted in two institutional
changes. The first was the creation in 2015 of the
Prosecution Unit for Violence Against Women (UFEM),
which dictates prosecution protocols and publishes an-
nual reports on the murders of women in the city of
Buenos Aires. The second development was the decision
of the Supreme Court of Justice (SCJ) to formally record
femicides and issue a nationwide annual report on such
cases. These recording initiatives ensure the visibility of
the murder of women.
Yet, the murder of trans women and travestis seem
to call for a conceptual twist of the theoretical notion of
femicide and its current criminal ‘translation’ for two rea-
sons. Firstly, the official reports on femicide and proto-
cols suggest that the inclusion of trans and travesti vic-
tims as ‘women’ has not always been consistent, show-
ing the limitations of the Gender Identity Law and bring-
ing to question whether the current notion of femicide
truly increases access to justice and fights impunity. For
instance, the UFEM reports interpret ‘women’ in line
with the Gender Identity Law and include all female sub-
jectivities regardless of their gender assigned at birth,
the formal registration of their gender identity, or how
they were identified in the criminal process. However,
the criminal framing of their murder has shifted through
the years, sometimes referring to them as homopho-
bic and transphobic femicide, sometimes as hate crimes
(UFEM, 2015) and, more recently, as travesticide (UFEM,
2018). The SCJ annual reports on femicide include trans
and travesti victims only since 2018 (Corte Suprema de
Justicia de la Nacion, 2018). The current gender-specific
crime of femicide, thus, even if read in line with the
Gender Identity Law, does not fully ensure the visibility
of trans and travesti.
Secondly, despite existing protocols, national ju-
risprudence suggests that the requirement that the
crime was committed ‘in a situation of gender-based
violence’ is often (mis)interpreted as calling for the
perpetrator to be the intimate partner (intimate femi-
cide) and the victim in a subordinated position in rela-
tion to the perpetrator. Such understanding of ‘gender-
based violence’ does not meet the demands of Radi
and Sardá (2016), who argue that a definition of trans-
femicide/travesticide must reflect that murder is the
most visible and final expression in a long chain of struc-
tural violence encouraged by a cultural, social, political,
and economic system, structured around the gender bi-
nary. The murder of trans/travestis constitutes, in fact,
the end of a continuumof violations they face. To achieve
any symbolic impact, the criminal definition must cap-
ture the specificity of these experiences.
2.3.2. Hate Crime
The 2012 amendment that incorporated femicide to
the Argentinian Criminal Code also incorporated sex-
ual orientation and gender identity (SOGI) to the list of
grounds aggravating murder based on ‘hate’ (Ministerio
de Justicia y Derechos Humanos, 2012b, Article 80.4).
The recognition of hate crimes, however, shows a very
different trajectory at the national level than that of
femicide or gender identity. Although such incorpora-
tion is in line with the recommendation of the Inter-
American Commission of Human Rights (IACHR, 2015,
p. 270) to “enact hate crimes legislation to identify, pros-
ecute, and punish prejudice-based violence against per-
sons due to perceived or actual sexual orientation and
gender identity,” debates on hate crimes based on SOGI
have not been prominent in Argentina. In fact, although
LGBTmovements in other countries have promoted hate
crime as a political and legal tool for addressing vio-
lence against the collective, the trans/travestimovement
in Argentina did not follow that line. Nevertheless, the
Homosexual Community of Argentina started issuing an-
nual reports on hate crimes in 2011, dedicating their
2015 Report to Diana Sacayán. In 2016, the Office of
the Public Defence of Buenos Aires, the National Office
of Public Defence, and the LGBT Federation formed a
National Observatory for LGBTI Hate Crimes.
Despite the incorporation of hate crimes based on
SOGI to the Code, there have been very few judicial
cases, particularly on transphobic hate crimes, and there
is consequently scarce national doctrine elaborating on
their defining characteristics. An overview of their key as-
pects, however, is needed to assess the potential of the
hate crimes for making trans murders visible and chal-
lenge impunity.
Regarding the visibility of the trans/travesti com-
munity, a relevant aspect of hate crimes is that per-
petrators target the victims’ (perceived) belonging to
a given group, not their individual traits (Craig, 2002;
Gerstenfeld, 2004; Mcphail, 2012; Perry, 2012). In fact,
Perry and Alvi (2011) argue that hate crimes are sym-
bolic acts performed for specific audiences, where the
perpetrator sends a message to the group that they are
unwelcome and that any group member could be the
next victim. Most definitions of hate crime, thus, revolve
around the group affiliation of the victim, yet only a few
of them emphasize the disadvantaged social positioning
and marginalization of victims and groups (Copeland &
Wolfe, 1991; Perry, 2012; Sheffield, 1995). Nevertheless,
group-based definitions often “tend to oversimplify vic-
tim groups and do not take into account the diverse
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experiences of victims and the nuances of the harms
they suffer” and prevent an intersectional understand-
ing of their identities (Mason-Bish, 2014, p. 42). In rela-
tion to trans persons, in particular, Meyer (2014, p. 122)
holds that mainstream hate crime discourse “aligns the
victim’s identity with normative conceptions of homo-
sexuality,” therefore representing victims in a gendered
and racialised manner, implicitly assuming that victims
of hate crimes are white middle-class gay men, hiding
other aspects and victims. The potential of hate crime for
making violence against trans/travestis visible will thus
largely depend on how group belonging is framed and
how victims are perceived.
Aspects connected to the subjective element of the
crimes may, in practice, jeopardize the prosecution and
punishment of the violence. Firstly, most definitions of
hate crime focus on the perpetrator’s bias (‘hate’) against
the victim (Zaffaroni, 2007). This means that, in addi-
tion to the intent to commit the crime, hate crimes
require a specific motivation behind their commission
(Figari, 2018; Hall, 2013; Jacobs & Potter, 1998; Juárez,
n.d.; Zaffaroni, 2007), which puts an additional burden
on prosecutors and the police that need to prove it (Hall,
2013). There is also much dissent among scholars on
what the motivation is. Hall (2013, p. 9) argues that it
is ‘prejudice’ and not hate that we refer to when we talk
about hate crime. The IACHR (2015, p. 44) specifies this
further, suggesting that hate crimes consist of “prejudice
motivated by the perception towards non-normative sex-
ualities and identities.” Jamel (2018), however, suggests
that transphobic hate crimes convey the offender’s ‘fear’
of trans people based solely on their physical appear-
ance. Argentinian scholars like Buompadre (2013) and
Figari (2018) argue that hate crimes are characterized
by an ‘extreme aversion’ of the perpetrator against the
victim’s group belonging. Each of these understandings
of ‘hate’ suggests a different intensity of the bias and
have evidence-related implications. For instance, Figari
(2018, p. 16) suggests that ‘aversion’ is so strong that it
calls for a psychological assessment to rule out any po-
tential exclusion of culpability due to mental and emo-
tional conditions.
Secondly, the way the causal link between prejudice
and the commission of the crime is defined by law will
also determine the number of cases prosecuted. If norms
require hate crimes to be only motivated by prejudice
to the exclusion of all other factors, fewer offences will
be recorded. According to Figari (2018, p. 9), Argentinian
law requires this connection. Conversely, if the causal link
is less strict and allows for other additional factors, e.g.,
economic interest, more offences will fall under the cat-
egory (Jacobs & Potter, 1998, p. 33).
Some aspects connected to the material elements of
hate crimes may prolong the impunity of some forms
of violence against trans/travestis. Hate crimes often
show high levels of cruelty that exceed the instrumen-
tal purpose of submitting the victim, particularly those
against LGBT persons (IACHR, 2015). For some authors,
this ‘overkill’ constitutes an objective element of the
crime (Hall, 2013; Jamel, 2018) that must be backed
by evidence, which means that crimes lacking such bru-
tality will not be prosecuted as hate crime. Moreover,
hate crime is usually associated with severe offences
only, excluding minor forms of violence (Meyer, 2014).
In Argentina, transphobic hate only aggravates murder
or severe bodily injuries, which means that other forms
of violence committed against trans/travestis, including
sexual violence and property crimes, will receive a ‘regu-
lar’ punishment with no indication of the motivation be-
hind them.
Despite the limitations of the crime of femicide and
hate crimes based on gender identity to make travesti
experiences visible described in these sections, the new
draft Criminal Code submitted to Congress in May 2019
keeps the wording of Article 80 (“murder of a woman by
a man” and “hate based on gender identity”; Ministerio
de Justicia y Derechos Humanos, 2012b) intact.
The next section explores the potential of the
current framework to address these three historical
trans/travesti claims in the criminal justice context.
3. The Diana Sacayán Case
3.1. Introduction to the Case
Diana Sacayán’s body was found gagged and with bound
hands and feet in her apartment in Buenos Aires on July
13th, 2015. Her body had multiple cuts and bruises, and
knives were found on the scene. The perpetrators forced
the front door from the inside to escape. A man with
whom she had an intimate relationshipwas chargedwith
her murder.
As mentioned, Diana Sacayán was a prominent ac-
tivist, trans human rights defender, representative of the
International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex
Association, and founder of the MAL. She also worked at
the National Anti-discrimination Institute (INADI). Diana
was the first person to change her gender identity after
the adoption of the Gender Identity Law and successfully
advocated for the adoption of trans quotas in the pub-
lic sector and a protocol for trans-specific public health
care in Buenos Aires. She had an established media pres-
ence. Her death severely affected the LGBT community
in Argentina. Diana’s family and civil society organiza-
tions mobilized after her death and formed a commis-
sion called ‘Justice for Diana Sacayán/End travesticide’
(‘the Justice Commission’). The Commission actively en-
gaged with the media, raising awareness and seeking so-
cial support. There was regular media reporting on the
case, with the collaboration of experts and activists.
There were four main acting parties in this case: the
defence, the main prosecutor, and two auxiliary prose-
cutors, one on behalf of the INADI and another on be-
half of Diana’s brother. In addition, the UFEM (supported
by the Justice Commission) acted as advisor to the main
prosecutor. The unusual number of persons involved in
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the trial reflects the public interest it evoked. Prior to the
final judgment, the head of the UFEM described in an
interview the role of the Justice Commission in relation
to the prosecutorial strategy in the case: “The construc-
tion was a collective one, with the family and the orga-
nizations. They [the Commission] asked for things that
forced us [the prosecutors] to reconsider some notions.
They voiced their concerns, we responded” (Revista
Institucional de la Defensa Pública, 2018, p. 337).
3.2. Main Arguments of the Parties
The parties based their arguments on a combination of
theoretical conceptualizations and legal notions, some in
unison and some diverging.
3.2.1. ‘Travesticide’ as a Theoretical Notion and Means
of Visibility and Recognition
This trial introduced the term travesticide in a judicial
procedure for the first time and brought it to the at-
tention of the media. The Commission emphasised two
aspects. Firstly, although gender-based violence is com-
mon to femicides and the murder of travestis, ‘travesti-
cide’ aimed at capturing the specificities of suchmurders.
Second, it attempts to make visible the structural vulner-
ability, marginality, and systematic violence affecting the
majority of trans/travestis. These two aspects lie at the
core of the notion, and in a way, comprises all claims de-
scribed in the previous section.
All prosecutorial parties agreed that the notion of
‘travesticide’ fleshes out the historical and structural dis-
crimination against trans/travestis and their exposure
to violence throughout their lives (Poder Judicial de la
Nación, 2018, p. 174). Yet, how to frame in criminal law
a murder theoretically conceptualized as travesticide?
Article 80 of the Criminal Code (Ministerio de Justicia y
DerechosHumanos, 2012b) offers the chance to criminal-
ize the murder as a hate crime based on the sexual orien-
tation or gender identity (Section 4 of Article 80), and/or
as ‘femicide,’ the murder of a woman by a man in a con-
text of gender-based violence (Section 11 of Article 80).
3.2.2. Travesticide as a Hate Crime
All parties considered that travesticide fell under the ag-
gravation of hate crime based on gender identity and
that this judgment was an opportunity to fill the doctri-
nal gap on such crimes in Argentina. In their oral plead-
ings, the prosecutorial parties followed the guidelines
of the 2015 Report on violence against LGBTI persons
by the Inter-American Commission―the IAC Report―to
assess the scope and evidentiary requirements for
hate crimes.
The prosecutorial parties highlighted the struc-
tural and discriminatory nature of the violence against
trans/travestis (Poder Judicial de la Nación, 2018, pp. 29,
32, 37), in line with Perry’s (2012) socio-structural ap-
proach to hate crime and the IAC report. They introduced
official reports and experts’ testimonies as evidence, and
more importantly, the testimonies of the trans commu-
nity regarding their life experiences. They also provided
long and detailed accounts of Sacayan’s life, paralleling
those of the trans community, a strategy also used by
the IACtHR in its judgments on femicide (Celorio, 2010;
Sosa, 2017). The UFEM emphasized the relevance of the
structural context and its legal implications, particularly
in relation to reparations.
Regarding the type of motivation that falls under
‘hate,’ the INADI and the main prosecutor considered
it refers to the “aversion” against a person or group
of persons (Poder Judicial de la Nación, 2018, pp. 32,
54), suggesting a threshold higher than that for “preju-
dice.” The prosecutor argued that such aversion was trig-
gered by the victim’s characteristics (Poder Judicial de la
Nación, 2018, p. 54), while the INADI considered it re-
sulted from the “contradiction between desire and re-
jection of the travesti body” (Poder Judicial de la Nación,
2018, p. 25). However, they did not explain the connec-
tion between the aversion of the abuser and the context
of discrimination and exclusion, thus contributing to the
idea that such murders are incidental and the product of
one individual.
The INADI and the defence lawyer agreed that al-
though the “aversion” belongs to the internal process of
the abusers, it shows in their actions and other explicit
or symbolic manifestations (Poder Judicial de la Nación,
2018, p. 33). The derogative comments by the mother or
acquaintances of the accused about trans persons could
constitute an indication of the aversion, the prosecutor
argued. The defence lawyer refused, however, arguing
that only the personal manifestations of the accused
could prove his aversion against travestis and, thus, addi-
tional evidence was needed (Poder Judicial de la Nación,
2018, p. 120).
3.2.3. The Relevance of Bodies in Travesticide
The INADI emphasised that the abuser could either
“leave a message on the walls or on the victim’s body”
(Poder Judicial de la Nación, 2018, p. 33). For all parties,
the victims’ bodies can indicate the special aversion of
the abuser, the intention to humiliate the victim, and the
rejection of her identity, proving the subjective element
of hate crimes (Poder Judicial de la Nación, 2018, pp. 22,
35, 44). Diana’s body thus became the main evidence of
‘hate.’ The three prosecutorial parties agreed that the
wounds on her breasts, buttocks, and face could prove
the aversion of the abuser (Poder Judicial de la Nación,
2018, pp. 22, 52, 55).
The connection between the definition of the crimes
and the overkill (high levels of brutality) determines the
level of violence travesti bodies are expected to have
suffered. For instance, the INADI considered that the
overkill was an inherent element of hate crimes, man-
ifested in victims’ bodies (Poder Judicial de la Nación,
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2018, p. 38). This implies that, in his view, these crimes
require excessive violence, even if the result is murder.
The defence lawyer agreed with him and added that
the IACHR illustrated ‘overkill’ with examples of extreme
(sexual) violence, such as decapitation, multiple ejacula-
tions on bodies, etc. (Poder Judicial de la Nación, 2018,
p. 114). He then argued that the level of violence dis-
played by Diana’s body did notmeet the required level of
severity, and that her wounds corresponded to weapons
used (knives) andher defensive behaviour (Poder Judicial
de la Nación, 2018, p. 115).
Conversely, the victim’s representative disagreed
with the inherent character of the overkill, arguing that
such excessive violence would in fact constitute an addi-
tional aggravation of the crime, falling under Article 80.2
(Poder Judicial de la Nación, 2018, p. 22). Under this ap-
proach, murders which are not exceedingly brutal could
still constitute hate crimes, and the instrumental role of
travesti bodies could be circumvented, along with the se-
vere scrutiny they are subjected to.
3.2.4. (Trans)femicide
Both auxiliary prosecutors understood that the mur-
der of Sacayán also fell under the aggravation of femi-
cide (Article 80.11; Ministerio de Justicia y Derechos
Humanos, 2012b) since according to the Gender Identity
Law she was a woman, and the crime was committed
in a context of gender-based violence. In fact, all pros-
ecutorial parties considered that Diana’s gender iden-
tity was enough justification to frame the crime as femi-
cide, without elaborating on the objective element―the
situation of gender-based violence. The prosecutor sug-
gested the subordinate position was evident “between
a man and a woman” (Poder Judicial de la Nación, 2018,
p. 39). Such a position, however, does not underscore
the structural context of violence against trans/travestis.
Particularly since the defence lawyer challenged the
classification of the crime as femicide because, he ar-
gued, Diana was not in a subordinated position. “She
appears as a political referent of LGBTI organizations,
speaking in International fora, with a large network. [The
suspect] is a shy boy, who keeps silent in meetings,
lives with his mother, has never been heard uttering a
gender-violence type of expression, and has no previ-
ous record in that sense” (Poder Judicial de la Nación,
2018, p. 130). Elaborating on how gender-based violence
transcends inter-personal relationships, thus ‘intimate
femicide,’ and how this can be proved in court helps to
capture the structural violence and discrimination that
trans/travestis face.
In addition, the main prosecutor considered that the
aggravation of femicide applied only subsidiarily if hate
crime is ruled out (Poder Judicial de la Nación, 2018,
pp. 58, 61). This raises the question of whether victims’
identities can be considered from an intersectional per-
spective if their deaths can only be framed either as a
hate crime or femicide.
3.3. The Final Judgment: Between Travesti Demands
and the Letter of Criminal Law
The tribunal, comprised of three judges, sentenced the
accused to life imprisonment for the murder of Diana
Sacayán, aggravated by Article 80.4 (hate based on gen-
der identity) and Article 80.11 (femicide; Ministerio de
Justicia y Derechos Humanos, 2012b). The 414 page-long
decision features the reasoning of Judge Calvete (chair),
Judge Baez, and the dissenting opinion of Judge Bloch.
Their combined argumentations clarify important legal
aspects of the violent murder of trans/travestis raised by
the parties, notably, the possibilities to capture the socio-
structural nature of such violence in criminal law and
evidence-related aspects of transphobic hate crimes.
3.3.1. Criminal Law and Socio-Structural Perspectives
on Violence
Perhaps the most notable aspect of the judgment is
the judges’ recognition of the structural nature of the
discrimination and violence against trans/travesti, with
clear references to the continuum of violence they suffer
(Poder Judicial de la Nación, 2018, p. 381). The statistics,
reports, and testimonies helped in shaping this new di-
mension. The judges’ depiction of Diana throughout the
judgment, informed by the vivid testimonies, went be-
yond the typical victim profiling and emphasized the par-
allel with the lived realities of travestis. This acknowledg-
ment includes the institutional dimensionof the violence.
Judge Bloch admitted that violence is often committed
by public institutions, particularly by the police (Poder
Judicial de la Nación, 2018, p. 314). She also underscored
that the lack of an investigation and prosecution leads to
the invisibility of the violence and explains the lack of ju-
risprudence on transphobic hate crime despite the high
prevalence of transphobic violence (Poder Judicial de la
Nación, 2018, p. 379).
All judges recognized that the conceptual use of ‘trav-
esticide’ reveals the complex structural dimension of the
violence affecting trans women. Bloch suggested that it
should be possible to introduce “as many names as there
are types of hatred and subjectivities,” if it helps in mak-
ing an existing problem more visible (Poder Judicial de
la Nación, 2018, p. 387). Calvete saw “no obstacle to
its forensic usage” if it helps clarify the case at hand
(Poder Judicial de la Nación, 2018, p. 174). That said,
Bloch pointed out that there are alternatives for legally
framing travesticide―as hate crime (Article 80.4), but
also as femicide (Article 80.11) when the victim is a
transwoman (‘transfemicide’; Poder Judicial de laNación,
2018, p. 388). However, Calvete and Báez, like the prose-
cutors, seemed to consider that ‘hate crime’ was the only
possible framing, which in practice may lead to overlook-
ing the socio-structural nature of the violence against
travestis (Poder Judicial de la Nación, 2018, pp. 175, 214).
Judge Bloch reveals the first challenge that hate
crimes pose to structural understandings of violence
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by highlighting that the legal definition of hate crimes
does not seek to protect groups facing structural dis-
crimination, as the prosecutor argued (Poder Judicial de
la Nación, 2018, p. 372). The judges agreed that hate
crimes are defined by the motivation of the abuser,
rather than the characteristics or group belonging of the
victim. It constitutes a hate crime when the abuser mur-
dered because of his aversion based on the gender iden-
tity of the victim, regardless of whether the victim was
really trans/travesti (Poder Judicial de la Nación, 2018,
pp. 173, 307, 325, 365). Hate crimes, Bloch argued, are
more severely sanctioned because they infringe on the
autonomy of the victim and other members of the ‘pro-
tected’ group in addition to the primary violation (against
life, physical integrity, sexual autonomy, property, etc.).
That “individual liberty,” she argues, is precious to all
democratic systems (Poder Judicial de la Nación, 2018,
pp. 316, 317). The second challenge arises precisely from
the legal conceptualization of ‘hate’ as ‘aversion.’ In line
with Figari (2018), Calvete explains that aversion points
to an individual motivation of a psychological nature, in
opposition to that in ‘femicide,’ which is “cultural or so-
ciological” (Poder Judicial de la Nación, 2018, p. 171).
Could hate crime ever capture the socio-structural un-
derstanding of travesticide, even when all judges have
acknowledged it?
The judges’ discussion regarding femicide and the
meaning of ‘gender-based violence’ also raises questions
regarding its usefulness to capture socio-structural per-
spectives. All judges agreed that trans women and trav-
estis constitute ‘women’ in the meaning of the law. They
agreed to a large extent about the nature of gender-
based violence. Judge Baez critiqued the legislative tech-
nique that establishes that only a man can be the per-
petrator of femicide and a woman the victim (Poder
Judicial de la Nación, 2018, pp. 272–274), yet he recog-
nised that, in line with the human rights documents rat-
ified by Argentina and the parliamentary debates on
femicide, gender-based violence is the expression of a
system of domination that perpetuates inequality be-
tween men and women, based on an unequal power re-
lation. Femicide, thus, recognizes a situation of subordi-
nation based on an unequal relation of power. For Judge
Bloch, however, such power relations cannot be taken
for granted in every relationship and must be supported
by evidence (Bloch, 2014; Poder Judicial de la Nación,
2018, pp. 396–397).
3.3.2. Proving ‘Hate’
Another challenging aspect of hate crime is the diffi-
culty to prove the subjective element, which all parties
linked to the body of the victim. In line with travesti
claims, Judge Báez elaborated on the social construction
of trans/travesti bodies, arguing that bodies are social,
cultural, and political entities affected by the norms, ex-
pectations, and stereotypes of the patriarchal society to
which they must conform (Poder Judicial de la Nación,
2018, p. 200). The asymmetry of power is, in fact, repro-
duced on bodies, adopting multiple forms and varying
from one culture to another. Yet this type of violence “of-
ten becomes invisible and naturalized through socializa-
tion, disguised as beliefs, legalized by laws, customs, pub-
licity and by stereotypes of masculinity and femininity”
(Poder Judicial de la Nación, 2018, p. 201). These dynam-
ics led to “the objectification of the feminine or trans-
sexual body” and thus “women are denied as subjects,
subdued, alienated and manipulated. Women or trans-
sexuals lose their individual agency and are subject to
men’s desire” (Poder Judicial de la Nación, 2018, p. 202).
Unfortunately, the judge did not explain how such social
policing on travesti bodies could be proved in practice.
Only Judge Bloch focused on the evidence aspect of
hate. She provided an inventory of applicable evidentiary
means based on the FBI guidelines and the IAC Report,
and then analysed the criteria mentioned by the par-
ties and judges. Among the elements indicative of hate
crime was the brutality of the crime and signs aiming
to erase the victim’s identity, (based on the location of
the wounds). Judge Bloch confirmed the relevance of
the IAC Report as a guiding document and agreed that
these criteria should guide the investigation and prose-
cution of hate crimes (Poder Judicial de la Nación, 2018,
p. 342). However, she disagreed that these criteria were
met in the specific case, particularly regarding the level
of brutality and the placing of the wounds. She consid-
ered that the level of violencewas not comparable to the
examples used in the IAC Report. She did not consider
that the wounds on the victim’s face, breasts, and but-
tocks were an attempt to ‘erase’ her travesti identity ei-
ther, but were consistent with self-defence signs (Poder
Judicial de la Nación, 2018, p. 345). Arguably, the long
and detailed discussion on bodies by Judge Baez could
have challenged this view if it had focused on the case at
hand, making a crucial contribution.
4. Final Reflections
Diana Sacayan’s trial constituted a means to seek justice
for her murder and a unique opportunity to consolidate
the right to gender identity and re-voice longstanding de-
mands about the integrity of travesti bodies, access to
human rights, and the right to a life without violence.
These demands were introduced to the trial through the
combination of procedural mechanisms and an overarch-
ing conceptual notion. The first proceduralmeasure used
was the informal interaction of an ad hoc Commission,
composed by family members, trans activists and other
allies, and the prosecution office. The second measure
was the intervention of Diana’s brother and the INADI
as auxiliary prosecutors. The third was the incorporation
of testimonies of gender/trans experts, activists, and wit-
nesses. Finally, media management during and after the
trial, prompted by the Justice Commission, triggered the
debate on the murder of travestis, and to a lesser ex-
tent, their living conditions.While this article has focused
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on the conceptual aspects of the trial, the procedural as-
pects would certainly merit further analysis.
The overarching conceptual notion of ‘travesticide’
was employed to name themurder of travestis andmake
visible the continuum of violence they face. The idea of
a ‘continuum’ helps to recognize not only the murder
but also the violence leading to it, such as the rejection
of trans/travesti identities and bodies and the exclusion
and denial of their human rights. The structural and in-
stitutional nature of such violence becomes clear. The
prosecutors introduced the notion and the tribunal unan-
imously accepted it. The judges disagreed about the pos-
sible criminal framing of travesticide, suggesting that dif-
ferent prosecutorial strategies can be devised.
The prosecutorial parties and two judges favoured
framing travesticide as hate crime based on gender
identity (Article 80.4; Ministerio de Justicia y Derechos
Humanos, 2012b). However, such framing raises three
issues that claimants should carefully consider. Firstly,
the structural nature of the violence is not properly cap-
tured by the crime because it focuses on the motive
of the accused, that is, their ‘aversion’ against travestis.
Murders appear as incidental, the result of a mad man,
despite the prevalence and structural nature of the vio-
lence. Secondly, hate crime establishes a high threshold
to prove guilt. While the IAC Report can guide in such an
attempt, victims’ bodies will inevitably become the main
piece of evidence. Thus, travesti bodies get scrutinized
once again in their death, submitted to a normative ex-
amination to find indications of the perpetrator’s aver-
sion. Finally, it is unclear if hate crime can capture the in-
tersectional nature of the discrimination against the vic-
tims, since, despite all testimonies about the richness of
Diana’s identity (‘trava sudaca originaria’ and activist), all
discussions ended up focusing on only one aspect: her
gender identity.
Judge Bloch argued the notion of ‘travesticide’ can
be criminally framed as gender-based violence against
women (Article 80.11 ‘femicide’; Ministerio de Justicia
y Derechos Humanos, 2012b) when the victim is a
trans woman or travesti. The tribunal confirmed that
trans/travesti women are protected under Article 80.11
since the adoption of the Gender Identity Law. Article
80.11 seems more in line with the structural element
of travesticide because it connects it with ‘gender-
based violence.’ That said, their subordinated position
requires proof. Moreover, given the legislator’s decision
to adopt a gender-specific approach (“male perpetrators
and female victims”; Ministerio de Justicia y Derechos
Humanos, 2012b) the specificity of travesticide is re-
placed by ‘women,’ imposing a binary viewof the travesti
identity. The question remains whether both the femi-
nist and travesti collective would agree to adopt a def-
inition of gender-based violence that focuses on ‘gen-
ders,’ without naming specific gender subjectivities. In
any case, the tribunal held that hate crimes and femicide
can concur, allowing a more intersectional view of trav-
esti identities.
In sum, Diana Sacayán’s trial was a collective
achievement that employed effective strategies to un-
veil trans/travesti experiences, nearing social and insti-
tutional recognition and accountability. The complexity
of travesticide, however, cannot be properly captured
by the current structure of neither hate crimes nor femi-
cide, rendering the criminal response insufficient. These
reflections can improve future criminal strategies, and
perhaps inform debates prior to the adoption of the new
draft of the Criminal Code.
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